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ABSTRACT
Since 1967 , when NATO adopted "flexible response" as
the alliance strategy, reliance upon the conventional leg
of the NATO triad has increased, including reliance upon
the West German Navy. The West German Navy's principal
mission is to implement the alliance's strategy of "forward
defense" in the Baltic. During the same period of time,
the non- Soviet Warsaw Pact naval forces in the Baltic, in-
cluding the East German Navy, have also been strengthened.
Thus, two well-equipped German navies of differing ideo-
logical and social systems face one another. This thesis
which is not meant to be comprehensive, surveys the follow-
ing topics in relation to both navies: German maritime
traditions; origins of the present German navies; organiza-
tional structure and relationships to alliances; doctrine,
strategy and missions; and capabilities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The bay of Liibeck in the Western Baltic represents the
maritime demarcation of East and West. There lies a nation
divided into two separate states— the German Democratic
Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. These states,
established after World War II, have since recovered from
that war's devastation and now maintain positions of in-
creasing prominence within their respective alliance systems
Their maritime capabilities have decidedly improved since
the war and now provide for the possibility of these two
fleets engaging one another within the context of a Warsaw
Pact-NATO confrontation.
Only relatively recently, since both alliances began to
place more emphasis on a possible conventional combat
scenario with an unreinforced forces-in-being surprise
attack, have the smaller navies of each alliance received
increased attention. In the recent past the supposition of
a probable nuclear conflict between the super-powers pre-
cluded the necessity to assign much responsibility to the
smaller navies.
The possibility of a surprise, forces-in-being, non-
nuclear attack in order to rapidly achieve a limited objec-
tive places particular pressure on the two German navies.
Each is situated on the foremost front of its alliance

system and, most assuredly, would encounter the other in
any naval action in the area. Their close proximity to the
strategically important Baltic Approaches also underlines
the importance of understanding more about the two German
navies.
This thesis attempts to provide greater insight into
the navies of the two Germanies so that we might work more
effectively in cooperation with the naval potential of our
NATO partners in the West German Navy, and so that we might
better understand some of our possible naval opponents, the
East German Navy and others in the Warsaw Pact's United
Baltic Fleet. To do so, this thesis is divided into chap-
ters on German naval history, the origin of the present
German navies, their structures and alliance relationships,
strategy and missions, and capabilities. Finally, a com-
parison analyzes similarities and differences.
No description of the present German navies could be
undertaken without at least a brief look at their past.
Chapter II considers the German Navy of 1848 and discusses
why and how it was needed to be rebuilt three times because
of war and misuse.
Chapter III examines the development of the two sepa-
rate German navies. The limitations after the defeat in
World War II in regards to disarmament are discussed. The
alliance affiliations of each state are scrutinized, in-
cluding methods to build a new fleet for each state that
would be acceptable within each alliance.
10

Chapter IV surveys the West German and East German
navies today and shows each navy's relationship to the
alliance to which it belongs. The West German Navy's re-
lationship to the North Atlantic Treay Organization will be
closely scrutinized as will be the East German Navy's re-
lationships to the Warsaw Treaty Organization. These
relationships are critical in establishing the ability of
each navy to operate as a national force and each navy '
s
contribution to the maritime forces of its respective
alliance.
First, the West German Navy's structure is studied.
Looking specifically at the chain of command both admini-
stratively and operationally, we determine what level of
control is exercised over this naval force from within the
West German Navy and what influence the maritime NATO
structure of the NATO Alliance has. These relationships
determine the degree of linkage between the Alliance and
this naval force.
The East German Navy is approached in the same manner
as the West German Navy. However, due to the secretive
nature of Communist countries, naval exercises are analyzed
in order to lead to conclusions about structure which in
the West would have been readily published. The approach,
however, is similar to that used in looking at the West
German Navy. First, a look at the East German Naval struc-
ture helps to determine the indigenous control of this
11

navy as compared to outside influence from the Warsaw
Treaty Organization and/or the Soviet Union. Then the East
German Navy's structural integration into the Warsaw Pact
is discussed, which leads to a determination of the freedom
of action allowed the East German Navy.
Chapter V explores the doctrine, strategy and missions
of both navies. This inquiry further elucidates the link-
ages between individual navies and the respective alliance
or between individual navies and the alliance leaders, i.e.
the United States and the USSR.
West Germany's doctrines and strategy are assessed in
the light of current agreements and statements. Then the
missions of this naval force are discussed within the con-
text of naval strategy and structure.
East Germany's doctrine and strategy are discussed with
insight derived from the linkages apparent through close
scrutiny of exercises, proclamations, agreements, and
daily operations. East Germany's naval missions are cate-
gorized on the basis of available information.
Chapter VI attempts to show the integration of alliance
relationships, doctrine and strategy into a viable naval
capability for each German navy to perform its mission.
Emphasis is placed mostly on the modernization programs
currently underway in each navy.
Chapter VII constitutes the comparison and the conclu-
sion of this study. Each naval topic presented is compared




Throughout the world it is difficult to find a country
with a military tradition as pervasive as in Germany. The
German emphasis on military prowess and on the militarist's
way of life has greatly influenced their history and their
psyche. So much so that the term Hessian, referring to an
inhabitant of the German state of Hesse, is often used to
describe a soldier or a mercenary. This emphasis on mili-
taristic ideals has permeated German society. Thus the
Germans have a particular respect for people who exude
traits of strict discipline and loyalty to a cause. These
virtues have repeatedly placed the German people among the
most productive and efficient of nations of the world.
However, paradoxically, these same admired strengths have
at least twice in this century proved purpose for world
despair— the German nation has been the focal point of two
world wars.
Due to Germany's militaristic outlook and its geograph-
ical position, right in the center of Europe, it is under-
standable why Germany has had a preponderance for the
maintenance of a strong army while at the same time
neglecting the navy. After all, how often had she been




Nevertheless, the German Navy might be traced as far
back, as to 1217 A.D. when the Frisian Navy aided the crusa-
ders with one hundred ships. That naval force had reported-
ly been the largest naval operation to that date. But the
most often accepted birth of the first German Navy dates
back to 1848 when the Frankfurt National Assembly granted
the sum of six million thaler to form the first German
Navy. The impetus for such action stemmed from the Danish
Navy's blockade of the German harbors of the North German
2
coastal states during the Danish-German War of 1848.
This development was shortlived. In 1852 the German
Navy was disbanded for lack of funding. It was not resur-
rected until around 1857, when a Prussian Navy came into
existence to fight off the coast of Morocco and later for
coastal skirmishes in the Franco-Prussian War. It was not
until Wilhelm II that Germany really began to think of an
expanded Navy in a modern sense. Wilhelm II was an ardent
admirer of Alfred Thayer Mahan's theory of sea power and
realized the political, military and economic advantages
acquired by such an investment.
It would be a Navy to counter the Dreadnoughts of the
Royal Navy and perhaps to help colonize distant lands. How-
ever, this vision was never to reach fruition, for World
War I and the Treaty of Versailles which marked its end,
was to interfere and force the scuttling of the then exist-
ing German fleet at Scapa Flow on June 21, 1919. The
14

First World War had seen little use of either the Royal or
the German Navy. In fact, the Battle of Jutland was to be
their only encounter at sea and it turned out to be inde-
cisive. Thereafter, neither fleet ventured far from home
waters; nor did either make a significant contribution to
the outcome of the war.
During the Weimar period the German High Command began
rebuilding the Reichswehr. Reverting back to neglecting
the rebuilding of the Navy, they had failed to learn the
decisive importance of sea power and how it might have
altered the result of the last war. They also failed to
see war against England as a possiblity. Admiral Raeder,
Chief of the German Fleet, on the other hand, began to lay
the foundations for a small balanced fleet.
"Under the Versailles Treaty the German Navy was limi-
ted to fifteen thousand men and a very small number of
4
ships." When Hitler came to power, realizing the poten-
tial power a nation relinquished without a sizable naval
force, he decided to attempt to change these Versailles
restrictions. He thought by completing an agreement with
England he might overcome this restriction without openly
repudiating the Treaty of Versailles.
On June 18, 1935 the London Treaty was signed between
Great Britain and Germany. The treaty limited the
German Navy to thirty-five percent of the British sur-
face fleet, and later agreements allowed the Germans





<Hitler informed Admiral Raeder of his real intentions
for Germany and "names England as a 'hateful enemy' on
November 4, 1937." Hitler's war plans greatly altered
Raeder 's plans for rebuilding the Navy, even though "Hitler
promised that there would be no war with England until
71944 or 1945." With that in mind Raeder, submitted "in
February, 19 39 the Z plan for the development of the fleet
which was as follows
:
6 Battleships By the end of 1944
4 Heavy cruisers By the end of 19 4 3
>4 Heavy cruisers By the end of 1945
,4 Light cruisers By the end of 1944
'3 Light cruisers By the end of 1948
2 Aircraft carriers By the end of 1941
2 Aircraft carriers By the end of 1947
126 U-boats (all types) By the end of 1943
22I<^
95 U-boats (all types) By the end of 1947
(Destroyers, etc., not included)






and a large number of destroyers, auxiliaries, etc."
Even with the Z plan completed the Germans lacked the
sea power to match the English fleet ship for ship. With
16

the early declaration of war on the third of September,
1939, the German Navy was in no way adequately equipped
for a great naval struggle with Great Britain. Admiral
Raeder summarized the German Naval situation at that time
as having a well-trained suitably organized submarine arm,
but still it was much too weak to have any effect on the
war. He considered the surface forces as "so inferior in
number and strength to the British fleet that they could
9do no more than show that they knew how to die gallantly."
Thus Raeder, knowing defeat to be the most probable naval
outcome for Germany, still maintained those militaristic
virtues of loyalty and discipline. He thought that the
German Navy could sustain two or three years of war and
possibly the Germans could win that quickly.
The war lasted for over five years, and confirmed the
Admiral's prediction that the German Navy was not prepared
for such a long conflict. The German Navy was reduced to
such an extent that by the final year of the war the only
possible major German naval action was in the Baltic,
where Vice Admiral August Thiele commanded the cruiser
Prinz Eugen and the pocket battleships Lutzow and Admiral
Scheer to provide additional artillery support for the
German Army's rear-guard action.
Throughout the Second World War the German Navy had
fought, courageously, often against terrific odds; and
true to their German heritage, the virtues of loyalty and
12

discipline endured. Admiral Raeder had appraised the
German Navy correctly.
Today's two German Navies have the same maritime heri-
tage. The West German and the East German Navies originally
included men with strong ties to the German maritime past.
The following chapters attempt to describe in greater




A. THE WEST GERMAN NAVY'S ESTABLISHMENT
The German Navy was completely disarmed after World
War II. It was not until September 1950 that the Western
powers considered possible West German remilitarization and
its participation in the defense of Western Europe under the
auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty. The North Atlantic
Treaty had been signed in April of 1949 as a defensive alli-
ance to offset the communist threat from Soviet-controlled
Eastern Europe.
The Korean War provided the impetus for transforming
the status of West Germany from a former enemy to that of
a future ally. The desire of the Western Allies to rearm
West Germany met with strong resistance from the opposition
Social Democratic party within West Germany and from the
Soviet Union. Only through the strong leadership of
Federal Chancellor Adenauer did West Germany sign the Paris
Agreements on October 23, 1954, making West Germany a mem-
ber of the Western European Union. West German rearmament
was finally achieved by the revision and expansion of the
Treaty of Brussels of 17 March 1948 which officially an-
nounced the West German will to rearm. This West German
action definitely proved West Germany's inclination toward
19

the Western allies and the Allied determination to make
West Germany an ally.
After the signing of the Paris agreements by West
Germany, the minister voted to admit West Germany into
NATO and on May 9, 1955, at a conference of NATO foreign
ministers in Paris, West Germany was formally made a member
of NATO
—
just four days after having regained her
sovereignty.
West Germany was admitted to the Western European Union
only after agreeing to restrictions placed upon the West
German manufacture of certain weapons on its territory.
Those weapons related to the West German Navy, as listed in
the original text of Annex III to Protocol III of the Paris
agreements, which could not be produced on German soil are:
(1) Long Range Missiles and Guided Missiles; (2) Influence
Mines (naval mines which can be exploded automatically by
influences which are initiated by external sources) ; and
(3) Warships, with the exception of smaller ships for
defense purposes. The warships which could not be manufac-
tured are (1) those of more than three thousand tons dis-
placement; (2) Submarines of greater than three hundred
fifty tons displacement; and (3) all naval combatants with
propulsion systems other than steam, diesel or gas engines
or gas turbines or by jet engines. Despite these restric-
tions, West Germany could be authorized to manufacture these
weapons upon the recommendation of the Supreme Commander of
20

NATO and upon the approval of the Council of the Western
12European Union by a two-thirds majority.
The rebuilding of the German Navy as a West German Navy
was first formally discussed between Chancellor Adenauer and
General Eisenhower at the Petersberg near Bonn in January
1951. However, prior to this meeting, there had been a
meeting of fifteen former German officers of the Army, Air
Force and Navy which had drawn up a tentative military pro-
gram for Germany. The proposed European Defense Community
and its political ramifications delayed the implementation
of any of these early ideas for a German Navy and left
German rearmament only with a scarce beginning by 1956.
The Paris Agreements obligated West Germany to rearm
and to rebuild a navy. Shortly after admission to NATO in
July 1955, the West German Parliament authorized the enlist-
ment of six thousand officers and men to form the nucleus
14
of a future half million men defense force.
By the end of 19 55 the West German Navy consisted of not
more than eighty naval officers and petty officers. A year
later, the West German Navy had eight thousand officers and
men with seventy vessels. By the end of 19 57 the numbers
increased to fifteen thousand officers and men and one
hundred ships . This naval posture equaled the personnel
strength of the German Navy between 1920 and 1933, with the





Chief of Naval Operations of the new Navy of the
Federal Republic of Germany was Vice-Admiral Friedrich Ruge.
He was to lay the foundation for this new navy with the
same determination and thoroughness Grand-Admiral Raeder had
in 1935. Admiral Ruge determined the particular type of
fleet he was to build largely by the particular waters in
which it was to operate. Almost all German naval operation-
al areas--the Baltic, the Danish Straits, the coastal waters
of the Channel and the North Sea— are shallow, and have more
than their share of fog, gales, currents and navigational
hazards. These waters are particularly well-suited for mine
warfare. Submarines find it difficult to operate because of
stratification of the water and salinity fluctuations—due
to the many large rivers entering these seas and their
shallowness
.
Taking the above into account and the restrictions placed
on the German Navy by the Paris agreement, no ship larger
than a destroyer had been planned for construction. Admiral
Ruge, however, wanted "destroyers with excellent anti-
aircraft armament, guns capable of firing at sea and land
targets, good anti-submarine warfare gear, minelaying
16
facilities, and some torpedo armament." These formed the
backbone of the new German fleet. On the following page is



























*Plus trainers, helicopters, and reserves.
Although the plans for the fleet had been drawn up and
partially accepted, Germany still lacked the shipyards to
make the German fleet a reality. All the former shipyards
had been totally dismantled after the war and no design
staff existed for warships. This difficulty was partially
remedied by assistance from her now NATO partners and the
consolidation of the Seegrenzschutz (a Coast-Guard-type
force) with the new West German Navy.
Additionally, the Labor Service Unit at Bremerhaven (a
unit used after the war by the United States to clear the
mines along the North Sea Coast) converted over to the Navy
in 1956 and along with it came a squadron of six large ex-
German minesweepers of six hundred tons and another squadron
of twelve ex-German motor minesweepers and one hundred forty
2 3

tons. Barracks well-suited for training purposes were also
acquired at Bremerhaven. The Seegrenzschutz (Sea Frontier
Police) provided twenty-six small vessels and approximately
eight hundred fifty out of one thousand men who joined the
new Navy. Along with these the Navy also acquired port
installations at Kiel, Cuxhaven and Neustadt in Holstein.
The Germans also received a squadron of PT boats from the
British and a squadron of five ex-German minesweepers from
18the French.
All of this, combined with the reestablishment of an
indigenous shipbuilding industry, was indicative of the
budding of a strong West German Navy to supplement the exis-
ting NATO maritime forces within the European Theatre. It
also would provide more of the naval force necessary to
defend West German territory.
B. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S NAVY OF NVA
The German Democratic Republic (GDR) was established in
the Soviet zone of Germany in October, 1949. Initially this
government used the "Bereitschaften" (Special Alert Units)
,
created in 1948, as the nucleaus for a military force. Most
of its members had been former German prisoners in Soviet
prisoner of war camps who had been indoctrinated in Marxism-
Leninism during their internment. By 1950— long before the
new West German state possessed anything resembling a mili-
tary establishment—this military force, which was supple-
mented by sea and air police units, had reached a strength
of fifty thousand men.1 24

The East German Navy or People's Navy was spawned in
February 1950 by a decision of the Politburo to form the
"Verwaltung Seepolizei" (Sea Police Administration) and to
19build maritime Sea Police Craft. This Sea Police Administra-
tion became operational on June 15, 1950 under the direction
of the Inspector General of the People's Police, Waldemar
Verner. To this day the fifteenth of June is the recognized
birthday for the navy in East Germany.
The newly formed Sea Police's mission was to secure the
coastline. It had a modest beginning, with three old jeeps
from the Wehrmacht. After the summer of 1951, they had one
hundred fifty horses which the government gave them to
increase their mobility.
At the second party conference of the SED in July 1952,
the party members decided, according to Admiral Ehm, to
improve the border security of East Germany by the deploy-
ment of military equipment at the side of the Soviet Army to
protect against counterrevolutionary attacks and imperialist
intervention. These decisions corresponded to the formation
of the Kasernierten Volkspolizei (KVP) from which evolved
in July of 1952 a Volkspolizei-See (People's Police-Sea).
Also a Grenzpolizei-See (Border Police-Sea) division was
formed to secure the coasts and was the sea contingent of
the East German Border Guard; since May 19 5 2 this has been
under the direction of the East German Ministry for State
Security. The Volkspolizei-See acquired an important
25

mission of clearing World War II mines from the sea lanes
and fishing areas of East German waters. The Grenzpolizei-
See received eight new coastal defense ships to enhance
21their mission of coastal defense. Both Volkspolizei-See
and Grenzpolizei-See worked closely together to improve the
protection of the East German coast.
Between 1952 and 1956 the East German shipbuilding
industry had been rebuilt and had been producing ships for
its navy. The People's shipyard at Stralsund and the Penne-
Shipyard in Wolgast together built twelve units of mine-
layers and minesweepers of the Habicht class. The mine-
sweepers of the Kriegsmarine are still in use today. Forty
ships of the Schwalbe class and approximately one hundred
coastal defense ships of the Tummler/Delphin class and the
Sperber class strengthened the coastal defense forces.
The training and flag ship of the East German Navy was
the Ernst Thalmann, a former Danish ship which had been
confiscated by the Germans in 1940 and later confiscated by
the Soviets from the Germans as war booty. It was later
returned to the Volkspolizei-See and completely overhauled
in 1952-53 at the Neptune shipyards in Rostock. This one
thousand fifty ton ship could give the new East German naval
officers practical seamanship experience. Those officers
having previously undergone naval technical training at the
Naval Academy in Stralsund, which was founded in January
22
1952, formed the nucleus for the emerging East Germany Navy.
26

The East German Navy was formed in March 1956. It was
subordinate to the newly formed National Defense Ministry
and the National People's Army, which were created by law in
January 1956. This new German Navy incorporated the
"Volkspolizei-See. " The "Grenzpolizei-See" remained a part
of the Border Police until 1961, when it merged with the
People's Navy.
This new East German People's Navy was given the tasks
to develop under the guidance of the Soviet Baltic Red
Banner Fleet into an effective part of the United Baltic
Fleet of the Warsaw Pact and to *naster the battle techniques
23
unique to the Baltic. The first joint exercise between
the Soviet Red Banner Baltic Fleet and the People's Navy,
according to Admiral Ehm, chief of East German Navy, took
place during July 1956, with ten minelaying ships, eighteen
24
coastal defense ships and forty-seven minesweepers. This
was followed by a Joint Baltic Fleet (Soviet, East German
and Polish naval units) exercise the following June under
25
the command of the Baltic Red Banner Fleet. These two
exercises initiated the many Joint Baltic Fleet exercises
which continue to improve the coordination between the three
Warsaw Pact Baltic Navies.
The present name of the East German Navy, the
"Volksmarine" (People's Navy), was not used until November
1960. This name was chosen in honor of the Kiel Sailor's
26
Rebellion of 1918. It was an attempt to further
27

disassociate the East German Navy from the national German
Navies of the past and to strengthen the binds of the East
Germany Navy to the Communist Party, thereby strengthening
the legitimacy of the East German regime.
The People's Navy has continued to improve its forces
through the use of its indigenous shipbuilding industry, an
economy slanted toward the military and close cooperation
with the Soviet Red Banner Baltic Fleet. East Germany con-
tinued to build most of its own smaller ships, such as its
landing craft and its minesweepers. However, larger coastal
defense ships have been obtained from the USSR. In 1978,
the original Soviet RIGA-class coastal defense ships began
being replaced by the newer Soviet Koni missile frigates.
This trend seems likely to continue. Thanks to the perform-
ance of the East German economy, the East German government
has contributed more to defense than any other Warsaw Pact
member. There is no doubt that the East Germans could build
a more capable fleet than that which exists. However, with-
in the context of their present political-military relation-
ships with the other Warsaw Pact states, its present stature




IV. STRUCTURES AND ALLIANCE RELATIONS
A. THE WEST GERMAN NAVY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO NATO
Since its humble beginnings in May 1955 the West German
Navy has developed into a very formidable naval force and a
most welcome asset to NATO's maritime forces. The Bundes-
marine is totally immersed within NATO's defensive strategy of
"a flexible response and a forward defense capability as a ba-
27
sis of deterrence." Its structure reflects this association.
West German control of the Armed Forces and, thus, of the
Bundesmarine is specifically addressed in the Basic Law. In
peacetime military command authority is vested in the civil-
ian appointed to serve as Minister of Defense. In a time of
crisis, however, this command responsibility is assumed by
2 8the Federal Chancellor.
The Chief of Staff Navy (also known as Inspekteur der
Marine, or Inspector of the Navy) controls the Fleet Command
(Flotten Kommando) , the General Naval Office (Marineamt) and
the Naval Support Command (Marineunterstutszungs Kommando)
which form the three main divisions of the Bundesmarine.
(See Appendix A) . The Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet
Command exercises control over both the naval afloat assets
and naval air forces, the commander of the Naval Support
Command directs the logistic support and maintenance of all
naval equipment and the General Naval Office oversees the
recruitment and training of individual sailors, supervises
29

research and development efforts and controls the Naval
29
medical program.
The Chief of Staff Navy also controls a command staff
(Fuhrungsstab) consisting of seven departments. These
seven departments of the Fuhrungsstab Bundesmarine command
staff are: (1) personnel, (2) military intelligence, (3)
operations, (4) organization, (5) logistics, (6) plans and
(7) research and development. These directly assist the
Inspector of the Navy in making command decisions.
"Das Flottenkommando"— the naval forces and naval air
forces of the German Navy—form the bulk of Allied maritime
defenses for the Baltic portion of the Northern flank of
NATO. The Bundesmarine provides approximately one third of
the naval assets immediately available in this area which
includes about three-fourths of NATO's maritime forces for
the Baltic.
The Fleet Commander, with his headquarters at Gliicksburg,
represents in his national role the Commander-in-Chief of
the German Fleet (CINCGERFLEET) and in his NATO role repre-
sents Flag Officer Germany (FOG) . (See Appendices C and D)
As Flag Officer Germany he is responsible to Commander
Naval Forces Baltic approaches in Karup, Denmark. To assist
in accomplishing his duties, the Fleet Commander is served
by a staff consisting of the following departments: (1)
personnel, (2) military intelligence, (3) operations, (4)
NATO, (5) planning, (6) readiness, (7) sanitation, (8)
30

administration, (9) legal and (10) geophysics. The Fleet
Commander and his staff work in close liaison with the
Naval Command Staff at the Defense Ministry, the Staffs of
32the Army, Air Force, and the pertinent staffs of NATO.
The only West German National Naval contingent is the
Standige Einsatzgruppe der Flotte (SEF— Standing Fleet
Operational Group) . This West German naval contingent con-
sists of three to five all weather capable units from the
destroyer fleet, one fast-patrol boat and one minesweeper.
Naval air contributes fighter, reconnaisance and ASW air-
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craft. Amphibious assets are also used as needed.
This West German Standing Operational Group is estab-
lished quarterly to operate together from four to six weeks.
These exercises allow the West Germans to measure their
readiness and capability to combat the threat in the North
Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the Baltic approaches. In that
naval environment the Navy must be able to react quickly and
in a well-coordinated manner to any attack or infringement
upon West German territory by employing the tactics of
"forward defense."
At Sengwarden near Wilhelmshaven is the headquarters of
der Befehlshaber der Seestreitkrafte der Nordsee (BSN
—
Commander German North Sea Fleet) . In peacetime he is sub-
ordinate to CIC Fleet Command at Gliicksburg and has the
responsibility for the naval units in the North Sea and
those in foreicn waters. In crisis situations his NATO role
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as Commander German North Sea SubArea (COMGERNORSEA) (see
Appendices C and D) subordinates him to COMNAVBALTAP
.
COMGERMNORSEA will then be responsible for the protection of
the transport of raw materials, reinforcements and resupply
to the European continent through the North Sea ports. The
operational difficulties in the North Sea will mostly entail
minesweeping, anti-submarine warfare, and the escort of
transport ships. NATO's naval command throughout the North
Sea in wartime relies upon close cooperation and interoper-
ability between the NATO navies of this geostrategic mari-
time area. COMGERNORSEA also provides reinforcement as
necessary to strengthen the adjacent NATO sea areas to the
34North, West and Baltic approaches as necessary.
Besides being principally subordinate to Allied Command
Europe through CINCNORTH and COMNAVBALTAP, the West German
Navy is also represented within ACLANT and ACCHAN. In
ACLANT the West German Navy has two liaison officers on the
staff. One officer is assigned as the West German electron-
ic warfare liaison officer and the other is assigned as the
intelligence liaison officer. The Bundesmarine also annually
sends approximately three destroyers/frigates for a four
month tour with the Standing Naval Force Atlantic
(STANAVFORLANT) . STANAVFORLANT was established by the
North Atlantic Council in December 196 7 and became operation-
al on January 13, 1968 in Portsmouth, England. it is sub-




STANAVFORLANT is a NATO naval task force of from five to six
destroyers and frigates. Constantly contributing to this
naval force are the United States, United Kingdom, Canada,
the Netherlands and West Germany. Occasionally, Portugal,
Norway and Denmark take part. This standing naval force can
always be augmented to form a larger force of many different
types of ships in national and international exercises,
which shows the versatility and flexibility of such a battle
group under NATO command. Some adherents have recommended
the formation of a second STANAVFORLANT, but whether this
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will take place remains to be seen.
The command of STANAVFORLANT is constantly rotated among
the major contributing nations to this naval force. However,
only since 1980 has the Bundesmarine been able to share in
this command rotation. This force attempts to upgrade the
overall efficiency and effectiveness of NATO Tactical
Procedures within the member navies and also provides a
symbol of political and military solidarity within NATO which
in peacetime is an aspect of the alliance which should not be
overlooked.
The West German Navy is also represented in NATO's
Standing Naval Force Channel (STANAVFORCHAN) , which was
formed in 1973 and is commanded by the Allied Commander-in-
Chief Channel (CINCHAN) at Northwood, England. This force
is a permanent multi-national naval squadron of mine counter-
measures (MCM) vessels which normally has between five and
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eight minesweepers and minehunters
. STANAVFORCHAN continu-
ously operates as a single unit and is commanded in rota-
tion by a senior officer from one of four Allies—Belgium,
the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom. In May of 1982 Fregattenkapitan Fritz




STANAVFORCHAN strengthens NATO in four important ways.
First, it shows NATO's unity wherever it sails by showing
the NATO flag. Second, it improves multi-national naval
teamwork within NATO by providing continuous mine counter-
measures experience and training. Third, due to its high
state of readiness, it is able to act as an immediate re-
action force for CINCHAN in times of crisis and, finally,
this naval force can form the nucleus of a more powerful
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naval force in the channel area, if the need arises.
Since its inception, the Bundesmarine has assumed much
of the responsibility for the maritime defense of the Baltic,
Baltic approaches and the North Sea areas within the opera-
tional control of NATO. Since 1967 the Bundesmarine has
also been a constant contributor to STANAVFORLANT and since
1973 to STANAVFORCHAN. Additionally, in 1980, West Germany
unilaterally increased its NATO operational capability by
extending its Navy's operational area beyond the former
restriction of sixty-one degrees North Latitude. This pro-
vides for a greater flexibility for West German maritime
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assets within NATO's maritime forces. Almost simultaneously
with the West German government's decision to extend its
operational area, the Western European Union, at the request
of SACEUR, eliminated all the restrictions on West German
production of warships or any other naval weapons, except
nuclear weapons. Clearly, this indicates a general NATO and
a specific West German desire to increase the capability of
the Bundesmarine to provide >a greater capability to defend
its territory and to improve its usefulness to NATO.
This close look at the West German Navy's structure shows
a navy which operates within an alliance that is not supra-
national in character and which depends very much on West
German contributions. Though the conditions that initially
forged the alliance allowed very few alternatives to the
West Germans, the present alliance structure gives the West
Germans as much influence within NATO's maritime structure
as any other member and in many cases-, such as STANAVFORLANT
and STANVFORCHAN , the West Germans have become constant
contributors to joint NATO maritime assets in areas distant
from its main area of responsibility.
B. THE PEOPLE'S NAVY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE WARSAW
PACT
The People's Navy has developed into a very capable East
German coastal defense force and a respected member of the
Warsaw Pact's Joint Baltic Fleet. According to Thomas
Forster, the People's Navy was fully incorporated into the
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"First Strategic Echelon of the Warsaw Pact in 1967."
This meant that in case of war in Central Europe its forces
would be immediately involved with the United Baltic Fleet
in achieving certain coordinated objectives.
The structure of the People's Navy closely resembles
that of the Soviet Navy. This resemblance has greatly
facilitated relations between the East German Navy and the
other navies of the Warsaw Pact. This command structure has
allowed for a smoother interaction between the East German,
Polish, and Soviet fleets in joint naval exercises and in
day-to-day operations.
The People's Navy has an administrative structure (See
Appendix IV) which originates from the National Ministry of
Defense in Berlin/Strasberg. General of the Army Heinz
Hoffmann has held the position of Minister of Defense since
1960. He is also a member of the Politburo and sits on the
Defense Council of the Warsaw Pact. Through these organi-
zations the Defense Minister has influence in every facet of
the government and reinforces the East German Military as
an instrument of the SED (Socialistische Einheits Partei)
.
Colonel General Heinz Kessler emphasized this necessary over-
lapping of influence between the military and the party when
he said:
"Like the Soviet Union's Communist Party, so also the
Socialist Unity Party of Germany follows the Leninist
Principle that the undivided leadership of the Army by
the Party of the working class and its Central Committee
is an objective law governing the construction of social-
ist armed forces. "41
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This Marxist-Leninist law of the party ruling the military
permeates the structure of all Warsaw Pact fleets, with a
marked emphasis on the Soviet example.
The Minister of National Defense is assisted by eight
Deputy Ministers, which form the nucleus of a General Staff.
The members in 1980 were:
"Lieutenant General Klaus-Dieter Baumgarten, Chief of
Frontier Troops; Admiral Wilhelm Ehm, Chief of the
People's Navy; Colonel General Werner Fleissner, Chief
of Technology and Weaponry; Lieutenant General Joachim
Goldback, Chief of Rear Services; Colonel General
Wolfgang Reinhold, Chief of Air Force/Air Defense;
Colonel General Horst Stechbacth, Chief of Ground
Forces; Colonel General Fritz Streletz, Chief of the
Main Staff and Secretary of the National Defense
Council. "42
This General Staff is the most important staff of the
Defense Ministry. It is responsible to the Commander of the
United Warsaw Pact for all operational planning and for the
military intelligence system. Additionally, it is responsi-
ble for organization, replacement of weapon systems, communi-
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cations equipment, military transport, etc. Within the
Ministry of Defense the main political administration is
unquestionably the most influential department. It directs
and controls the political indoctrination of the military
through the use of deputy commanders for political affairs
who are responsible to the SED and the FDJ (Free German Youth
Group, an exact duplication of the Soviet Komsomol)
.
Colonel General Heinz Kessler has been in charge of the
Political Main Administration since early 1979. The fact
that Kessler has held the positions of Chief of the Air
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Force and Chief of the Main Staff and had already been a
Deputy Minister before he took over the Main Political
Administration underscores the importance of this function
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within the East German Armed Forces.
The other main administrations within the Ministry of
Defense are self-explanatory and equate readily to standard
military usage of organizational structure. The Main
Administration for Technology and Weaponry controls research
and development of weapons equipment for example.
The Main Administration for Rear Services plans and co-
ordinates supplies and troop logistics. Civil Defense as of
1977/78 has also come under the control of the Ministry of
Defense and in all practical respects represents another
Main Administration function. The other Main Administrations
are the NVA-Army, the NVA-Air Force, the NVA-Navy and NVA-
Border Guards.
The People's Navy is headquartered in Rostock/Gehlsdorf
and is commanded by Admiral Wilhelm Ehm, who is directly
responsible to the Ministry of Defense. The naval command
structure resembles the Soviet model very closely and relies
heavily on centralized command and control. Admiral Ehm
emphasizes that the development of the People's Navy into a
modern socialist navy was accomplished from "proven Marxist-
Leninist principles of the German revolutionary battles and
the international worker movement, and especially, on the
knowledge of Soviet military science and the experiences of
45
the already tested Soviet Army and Navy."
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The close cooperation of the People's Navy with the
Polish Navy and the Soviet Baltic fleet further enhances the
benefits of this mutual command structure and is a more
likely explanation for this duplication. The Volksmarine
operationally is subordinate to the joint Warsaw Pact Fleet,
which is headquartered in Leningrad.
Appendix E shows the administrative structure of the
People's Navy. It can be divided into three major divisions
(1) Education and Training, (2) the Flotilla Division and
(3) the Coastal Brigade force. It must be emphasized that
these divisions are not controlled by a division or fleet
commander but each unit is subordinate to Admiral Ehm, Chief
of the Navy, in Rostock. For tasking, however, each divi-
sion fulfills a major specific function of the overall
mission of the Navy which is greatly influenced by the
United Baltic Command in Leningrad.
The division for Education and Training includes under-
graduate, graduate and the enlisted educational programs.
The Karl Liebknecht Naval Academy in Stralsund trains young
men to become Volksmarine officers. There are two
curriculums—one for training seagoing officers and another
for training engineering officers. These programs closely
resemble the Soviet style of officer education. Karl
Liebknecht offers a four year curriculum with time off only
for practical training. Upon graduation the officers ac-
quire the rank of lieutenants and receive the equivalent
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of a civilian engineering degree. Post-graduate education
prepares an officer for advanced assignments such as a flag
officer on a staff. Officers can attend the Friedrich Engels
Military Academy in Dresden and/or a Soviet military academy
such as the Voroshilov Academy, the Frunze Military Academy
in Moscow or the Grechko Naval Academy in Leningrad. Petty
Officer training is primarily conducted at the Fleet School
46in Parow near Stralsund and at Kuhlingborn.
The Flotilla division contains the main operational
components of East Germany's naval force. The First
Flotilla located at Peenemunde is equipped with minewarfare
units, amphibious ship units and an anti-submarine warfare
unit. The Fourth Flotilla at Warnemunde is equipped with
minewarfare units, an anti-submarine unit and a coastal
defense unit developed around the Soviet KONI class frigate.
The Sixth Flotilla at Dranske-Bug on Rugen Island is assign-
ed fast patrol and attack units such as the OSA I and II
and the Shershen class. Another operational component is
the Ernst Moritz Arndt 8th motorized rifle division at
Prora which provides the Navy with its only naval infantry
capability. The Naval Helicopter Detachment at Rostock
with about twenty aircraft of the MI-8/HIP type forms the
People's Navy only air forces. These are located at Rostock
and are configured to perform transport, rescue and anti-
submarine warfare missions. The Flotilla Division is sup-




The Coastal Brigade forms the Third Division of the
People's Navy. It was transferred from the Border Guards to
47the Navy in November 1961. This brigade has its head-
quarters in Rostock. Today it consists of approximately
three thousand men divided into a sea unit of eight boat
48groups and a land unit of twelve battalions. It continues
to function as a maritime extension of the Border Guard
troops
.
The East German Navy continues to operate in a very
centralized fashion, as mentioned above. The Soviet influ-
ence is undeniably ever present throughout this entire
national command structure. The Soviets maintain approxi-
mately one hundred Soviet officers within the East German
Ministry of Defense, apparently to oversee the reliability
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of this ministry within the Pact structure. " This duplica-
tion is most evident in both the military and the political
administration sections of the East German Command.
Operational control over the East German Navy is exer-
cised through the Joint Warsaw Pact Fleet with its head-
50quarters in Leningrad. Ultimately, Admiral of the Soviet
Navy Gorshkov probably maintains control. Admiral Ehm, the
Chief of East German Navy, in his writings about the East
German Navy, continually emphasizes the need for this close
cooperation between the socialist fleets against the
"capitalist aggressor," NATO. He states that "since 1971-72
the combined Socialist Baltic Fleets have operated from a
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common operational plan of ' Gefechtsdienst ' with the pur-
pose to fulfill the tasks of the party and government
leaderships .
"
From continuous monitoring of East German naval opera-
tions, it is evident that the cooperation of the three Baltic
fleets has continuously improved since the first joint East
52German-Soviet tactical naval exercise in July 1956. Today
we see an East German Navy that works daily with the other
two fleets of the Baltic to defend "socialism's gains"--that
is, to defend the coastline of the Baltic socialist states
and to prepare for any eventual confrontation in the Baltic
and surrounding seas.
Recently this cooperation has extended to the Soviet
Northern Fleet. In the 1982 Joint Warsaw Pact naval exer-
cise which was conducted in the Baltic, North and the the
Norwegian seas, all four fleets, including the Northern
Fleet's nuclear submarine assets and its long range naval
air assets coordinated anti-submarine warfare (ASW) , anti-
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air warfare (AAW) and replenishment at sea training.
Possibly this indicates the way the non-Soviet Pact naval
assets would be used in a real war. They would be used to
supplement the established Soviet Navy structure— a thesis
the Scotts predict for the entire Warsaw Pact forces in such
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an all out war scenario. Thereby, they would become more
of an adjunct to the Soviet Navy than to the Warsaw Pact
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and totally unable to perform as a national asset to defend
their own territory.
In peacetime the command structure originates its
authority from the Joint Pact Fleet Headquarters in
Leningrad through coordination with the East German Ministry
of Defense. In wartime, the possibility of the East German
Navy becoming simply an adjunct of the Soviet Navy appears
very real, when the coordination achieved in the various
exercises is taken into account and past Soviet wartime
organization is studied. In World War II, all Soviet armies
were placed under the centralized command and control of the
Soviet Military Staff. This would provide the Soviet leader-
ship the ultimate in control centralization of the military
forces at its disposition— a most necessary arrangement,
according to Soviet Military doctrine.
The East German Navy then finds itself within the web of
the Warsaw Pact, which ultimately appears as a means of
Soviet control over the -military forces of Eastern Europe.
The existence of one hundred Soviets stationed within the
East German Ministry of Defense; the evidence of all the
higher echelons of command within the Warsaw Pact having
always been occupied by Soviets, training of all of the
higher military leaders within the USSR, the centrality of
the Communist party to the Armed Forces of a Communist
country and, finally, the placing of all East German forces
directly under the command of the Warsaw Pact all indicate
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a strong adherence to the Soviet will. The East German Navy
can probably best be described as a coalition navy which
sails in the wake of the Soviets.
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V. DOCTRINE AND MISSIONS
A. THE DOCTRINE, STRATEGY AND MISSIONS OF THE WEST GERMAN
NAVY
The terms doctrine and strategy have been used inter-
chageably in NATO to define the defensive posture which NATO
takes to counter the threat from the Soviet Union and the
Warsaw Pact. This strategy is composed of three elements-
deterrence, defense and detente. Deterrence has been
credited for the maintenance of peace in Europe since May
1945 and is considered the major component of NATO's three-
pronged strategy. Until 1967 this deterrent strategy was
called "massive retaliation." This policy maintained its
viability as long as the United States held a decisive nucle-
ar superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. However, by 1967
the global nuclear strategic picture had been altered con-
siderably and the Soviet Union was nearing nuclear parity
with the United States. Therefore, NATO adopted the strate-
gy which is in use today, the strategy of "flexible response."
"Flexible response seeks to provide a whole spectrum of
military capabilities which will enable NATO to meet aggres-
sion at any level with an appropriate response." The
aggressor must be unable to calculate the costs of aggres-
sion because of the risks of escalation to an all-out
nuclear war. Flexible response permits NATO to respond to
aggression on three basic military levels. This military
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response can be achieved either by consecutive application
or by simultaneous application of the three major responses.
The three responses are:
Firstly, Direct Defence with the intention of pre-
venting an aggressor from reaching his objective, in
fact at the level of military conflict chosen by him.
Then either the aggression fails, or the aggressor is
confronted with the risk of escalation. NATO does not
preclude the use of nuclear weapons.
Secondly, Deliberate Escalation is intended to re-
pulse an attack by changing the quality of the defen-
sive operations through the use of nuclear weapons, or
by expanding the regional scope of the conflict. The
objective is to make the aggressor understand, through
the politically controlled selective use of nuclear
weapons , that the prospects of success are no longer
in proportion to the risk he incurs. Moreover, the
aggressor may be struck where he is most vulnerable, or
with resources superior to his own.
Thirdly, General Nuclear Response is directed mainly
against the strategic potential of the aggressor and
implies the employment of strategic nuclear weapons of
the Alliance. The threat emanating from these weapons
is NATO's strongest deterrent, their use is NATO's
most powerful military response. 56
Reliance upon the "flexible response" strategy in-
creased the importance of the conventional NATO force pos-
ture within the NATO Triad. The NATO Triad had depended
upon the theatre nuclear force arm and upon the strategic
nuclear forces of the United States and the United Kingdom
to the neglect of NATO's conventional forces. With
"flexible response" as the new NATO strategy, NATO realized
that all components of the Triad must complement one another
and form an inseparable defensive structure. Each component
must be credible by itself to provide an adequate deterrent
capability throughout this entire strategy spectrum.
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The Naval forces within NATO which form part of NATO's
deterrent posture are of two types: the Standing Naval
Forces (STANAVCHAN and STANAVLANT) which show NATO's commit-
ment and solidarity and the Strategic Ballistic Missile
Submarine Force which is an indispensable part of the
strategic nuclear triad. Both types provide any potential
57
aggressor with the incalculable risk of aggression. The
response of all member nations conventionally also must be
taken into account and undoubtedly enter into the deterrence
and defense equation for the aggressor.
If deterrence fails, the strategy to be employed, at
least initially, is contained in the Tri-MNC Concept of
Maritime Operations. This document has been approved by
NATO's political leaders and developed by the Maritime
Posture Task Group of the Long Term Defence Program of 1977.
The Tri-MNC concept establishes NATO's maritime interests
and evaluates possible threats to these interests. It also
considers different scenarios of aggression and Allied
priorities in meeting this aggression. The concept estab-
lishes the principles to be used by NATO forces and outlines
the probable campaigns and the forces needed. The Tri-MNC
concept establishes the principles of containment, defense
in depth, and maintaining the initiative. Additionally, it




For the West German Navy, NATO's maritime strategy is
a national naval strategy. The strategy of "flexible
response" combined with strategy of "forward defense" allows
the West German Navy to accomplish all the tasks of a
national naval force with the assurance of the cooperation
and assistance of the other alliance member navies.
Due to West Germany's strategic-geographical location
in the center of Europe and bordering on the Warsaw Pact
states, the only viable strategy is a strategy of "forward
defense." The 1979 West German White Paper states that for
the Federal Republic of Germany there can be no alternative
to forward defense and any model of defense involving the
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surrender of territory is unacceptable. Forward defense
is defined as "a coherent defense conducted close to the
intra-German border with the aim of losing as little ground
as possible and confining damage to a -minimum. This in-
cludes the recapture of lost territory." This demands
that NATO be capable and ready for a powerful and immediate
retaliation in the event of an attack. The Navy also readi-
ly accepts the challenge of forward defense and its meaning
for the Northern flank of Central Europe.
"Forward Defense" for the Navy implies reliance upon
reconnaissance in the direction of the threat and the
establishment of a forward barrier consisting of submarines,
surface combatants and minefields. The West German Navy and
NATO depend on this strategy to provide a maritime defense
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in depth which will provide ample warning to allow for
timely reinforcement for the coastal defense of Denmark and
Schleswig-Holstein, along with the defense of the Baltic
Approaches and the SLOC's (Sea Lines of Communication) for
the North Sea. 61
This strategy was greatly enhanced in July 1980, when the
West German government removed its self-imposed restriction
consisting of a twenty-four hour sailing time limit from the
Baltic Approaches. This restriction had essentially re-
stricted the German Navy's operational area to sixty-one
degrees North Latitude and to the Dover-Calais line in the
English Channel. The West German Navy can now apply the
strategy of "forward defense" with increased flexibility
toward the North Cape area and thus strengthen NATO's defense
in this strategic maritime area. This decision by the
Federal Security Council underlines the German view that the
Norwegian Sea, the North Sea, the Baltic Approaches and the
Baltic form one strategic and operational entity.
The missions of the West German Navy correspond primarily
to its strategic-geographical location in Central Europe, to
its relationship to NATO, and its increased standing within
the international system. According to Vice-Admiral Ansgar
Bethge, the mission of the German Navy is to contribute to
Allied Maritime Defense in the sea areas of the European
Northern Flank in order to prevent attacks at or across the
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sea against the Federal Republic.
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The Navy's mission is to repulse aggression initiated at
sea or across the sea to protect West Germany, its allies
and the sea lines of communication so essential to NATO's
and West Germany's viability. The Navy also provides a
flexible political tool of use to diplomats when political
tensions rise. Through port visits to foreign ports the
Navy improves relations with other countries. It also
strengthens the NATO Alliance's solidarity by participating
in exercises, helps to maintain international law at sea,
and supports the two standing NATO Naval Fleets. The Navy
also supports marine scientific research and renders humani-
tarian aid through search and rescue.
The Navy works in close cooperation with the other NATO
naval forces and with the air and land forces to accomplish
its overall mission. The German Navy's defense mission
focuses on NATO's Northern Flank, with special emphasis on
the Baltic and the Baltic Approaches, where the German Navy
provides seventy percent of NATO's naval forces and one
hundred percent of NATO's naval air forces. Because of
the Baltic's proximity to the West German landmass, the West
German Naval positions in the Baltic complement the forward
defense posture of the land forces stationed in West Germany
by protecting a vulnerable flank in any major East-West
military conflagration. It also allows more flexibility for
the other alliance maritime assets such as those of the




The sea area of NATO's Northern Flank is the major opera-
tional area of the West German Navy. The Northern Flank's
importance to the whole of NATO in a conflict should not be
overlooked. Central Europe is essentially a peninsula land-
mass, as is Northern Europe. Control of the surrounding
areas in a time of confrontation is essential for NATO's re-
supply of Europe. The key to effective control of Northern
and Central Europe lies in the Baltic Approaches and control
of Denmark.
A clearer understanding of the importance of this sea
area can be gleaned from the worth of the Danish Straits to
the Soviet Union. The Soviets are at a severe disadvantage
when it comes to the ability of their fleet to reach blue
water. The Baltic Fleet must either seek passage through
the Danish Straits, the Kiel Canal or the White Sea Canal to
reach the major oceans. Recent exercises show the Soviet
Navy's Northern Fleet and the United Baltic Fleet in joint
maneuvers in the Baltic, North Sea and the Norwegian Sea.
The constant surveillance of the straits by Warsaw Pact
Navies and the continuing movement of the Baltic Fleet exer-
cises to the Western Baltic region indicate the Soviet real-
ization of the strategic importance of Denmark and its
straits. The Russian desire to control the straits dates
back to Peter the Great's time and his desire to make the
Baltic a Russian lake.
51

The West German Navy and the Danish Navy have the respon-
sibility for the control of the Baltic Approaches and the
Baltic Sea (See Appendix C) . They operate through the NATO
command at Karup, Denmark (COMNAVBALTAP) as FOG (Fleet
Officer Germany) and FOD (Fleet Officer Denmark) . The compo-
sition of their fleets positioned in these waters reflects
the existing geographic realities and the potential threat.
The North Sea operational mission is also a combined
alliance mission of the many peripheral states. It usually
consists of several large naval contingents of the bordering
coastal fleets. Their combined mission is to secure the use
of the North Sea for NATO's own purposes and to prevent its
use by the enemy. A secure North Sea will permit NATO
reinforcement of Europe from North America and allow the
North Sea to be utilized by carrier battle groups. The
Command for the West German Naval contingent for the North
Sea also is at CONNAVBALTAP . (See Appendix B)
The West German Navy also has naval contingents serving
with the Standing Naval NATO Forces (STANAVFORLANT and
STAVFORCHAN) . Their respective missions are securing the
Atlantic sea lines of communication and minesweeping. Obvi-
ously, their operational areas are for STANAVFORLANT in the
Atlantic and for STANAVFORCHAN in the English Channel. The





The NATO strategy of "flexible response" with emphasis
upon forward defense uses the West German Navy to maximum
advantage. This strategy provides for the achievement of
both national and alliance maritime goals with the maximum
utilization of national resources.
B. EAST GERMAN NAVAL DOCTRINE, STRATEGY AND MISSIONS
The military doctrine, strategy and tactics of most of
the East German military establishment emanates from the
Soviet Union. With the possible exception of Bulgaria, no
other state within this alliance is more closely linked to
the Soviet Union than East Germany. This linkage has been
achieved because of the post-war Soviet occupation of the
eastern part of a divided Germany and the subsequent culti-
vation of the Communist party of Germany. Today the SED
(Socialist Unity Party of Germany) controls East Germany.
The SED and the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union)
constitute the vital core of relations between these two
countries. These two Communist parties "direct and coordi-
nate the entire multifaceted and interlocking system of
relations between both states and assure its functioning as
a unified whole on the basis of the principles of Marxism-
Leninism. " This social-political linkage has led to the
" Brotherhood- in-arms" concept which attempts to further the
Marxist-Leninist principle of the socialist-international.
The socialist-international attempts to unite all Communists
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under the idea of class war, as exemplified by the East
German Minister of Defense Heinz Hoffmann in April 1982:
We will do everything in our power to fulfill our class
mission with honor at all times. Shoulder to shoulder
with our comrades-in-arms in the Soviet Union and the
fraternal socialist countries, the GDR soldiers will
protect the socialist order and peaceful life of GDR
citizens and those of all states of the socialist com-
munity against any attacks by the aggressive forces of
imperialism and reaction. ^9
These ideals are constantly reiterated and form the nucleus
for adoption of legitimizing the Soviet Marxist Leninist
military doctrine for the entire socialist commonwealth.
Marxism-Leninism forms the foundation for Soviet mili-
tary doctrine, and thus easily and naturally adapts to all
Communist military structures. Marshall A. A. Grechko
,
Soviet Minister of Defense, described military doctrine in
1975 as "a system of views on the nature of war and methods
of waging it, and on the preparation of the country and
army for war, officially adopted in a given state and in its
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armed forces." Marshall Grechko further states that mili-
tary doctrine answers the following questions
:
What enemy will have to be faced in a possible war?
What is the nature of the war in which the state and
its armed forces will have to take part? What goals and
missions might they be faced with in such a war?
What armed forces are needed to perform the assigned
missions they might be faced with in such a war?
How are preparations for war to be implemented?
What methods must be used to wage war?
The whole of military doctrine concerns future war.
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The answers to these questions which are derived from
the party form the foundation for the logical (scientific)
development of a sound military strategy, and from this
strategy the tactics and missions of each military force
can be determined. This whole process is recognized to
exist within a dynamic environment; and as the answers to
the different questions change, so must certain factors
within strategy and tactics change.
Accordingly, the Soviets and the East Germans answer
these questions in concert with only minor deviations. Both
see the enemy as the imperialist, capitalist countries.
They view the next war as being unleashed by the "aggressive
imperialist states" and consider nuclear weapons the main
means of destruction. However, since the unveiling of
NATO's "flexible response" strategy in 1967 the CPSU
(Communist Party of the Soviet Union) has modified its doc-
trine to include the possible use of conventional weapons,
because "world war might break out by growing out of a
72local conflict--a local war." It is interesting to note
that Warsaw Pact exercises and maneuvers have followed this
doctrinal adjustment. The 1965 exercise "Vltava" was
totally nuclear whereas in 1967 "Dnieper" started with a
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non-nuclear phase which eventually went nuclear. This
doctrinal shift did increase the Soviet need for the Warsaw
Pact forces and a new focus on their utility in this new
doctrine.

The strategy of the East Germans assumes a coalition
response to any aggression in order to maintain the integ-
rity of the GDR and most importantly the survival of the
Communist party. The Soviet Union's military strategy is
duplicated by the East Germans and studied most diligently
by the East German military elite, who are schooled in the
Soviet Union at the Soviet military academies such as
Voroshilov and Frunze.
Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet
Armed Forces, General A. A. Epishev, defines Soviet military
strategy as coalition warfare:
Soviet military strategy considers a future world
war, if the imperialists succeed in unleashing it, as
a decisive conflict between two opposing world socio-
economic systems— the socialist and the capitalist.
It is assumed that in such a war a majority of
the states of the world would be drawn in simulta-
neously or consecutively.
This will be a global conflict unprecedented in
extent and severity, a conflict of multi-million
coalition armed forces which will be conducted with
no quarter, with the most decisive political and
strategic objectives . 74
This military strategy of coalition warfare is where
the United Baltic Fleet with the East German Navy began to
enter into the picture of Soviet military art and the
strategic, operational and tactical utilization of such an
asset for the defense of socialism. The East German Navy's
membership in the United Baltic fleet with headquarters in
Leningrad makes it almost totally influenced by Soviet
naval strategy— a strategy which has seemingly gained
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immense prestige relative to the other Soviet military
branches (i.e., Army, PVO Strany, etc.) within the last
couple of decades.
Admiral Gorshkov, in his series Navies in War and Peace
,
which appeared in Morskoj sbornik , improved the influence
of the Navy within the scope of military strategy for both
peace and war. He delineated the political advantages in-
curred by possessing a fleet that could place additional
emphasis on any political adventure anywhere in the world
just by its presence. Through his writings and naval leader-
ship, he is credited with laying the foundation for the
present Soviet Navy, which extends to both the United
Baltic fleet and the United Black Fleet. Gorshkov, in his
last article of this series, listed the three tasks which
form the nucleus for the Navy's basic wartime mission as:
(1) contributing to strategic strike,
(2) blunting strategic strikes by enemy units, and
(3) participating in the operations conducted by ground
forces in the continental theatres of military
operations . '5
The majority of naval strategy for the East German Navy
evolves around the execution of this third mission. However,
the East German Navy seems to be acquiring the capability to
also help pursue the second mission as seen in the 1982
Warsaw Pact exercise which saw the East Germans in the
Norwegian Sea conducting ASW operations.
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Nevertheless, the East German Navy is primarily a
Baltic Navy and has seldom sailed in any other sea. With-
in the context of the Joint Baltic Fleet the People's Navy's
officially stated task in peacetime is
in close cooperation with the Soviet Baltic Red
Banner Fleet and the Polish Naval forces to pre-
serve peace in the Baltic Sea and protect the
security of the maritime border of neighboring
socialist countries and the inviolability of GDR
territorial waters. '6
In a European war scenario the Baltic Sea is considered
an inner zone. (Within the parlance of Soviet naval opera-
tions an inner zone is a sea area where superiority of force
allows local command of the sea to be secured as compared to
an outer zone, where command is actively contested.) The
Baltic Sea must be totally controlled by seizing the strate-
77gic barriers, i.e., the Danish Straits. The Joint 3altic
Fleet is most readily prepared to mount such an operation
with its preponderance of amphibious and assault forces.
In wartime then, the principal missions of the East
German Navy would be
:
(1) Achieve control of the Western Baltic from NATO
forces, primarily the West German Navy
(2) Transport of amphibious Warsaw Pact Forces
(3) Provide "Fleet to Shore" support of the maritime
flank
(4) Secure SLOC's and
(5) Provide bases and support for the other Warsaw
Pact Navies operating in the Western Baltic. 78

These East German naval missions would change with
Warsaw Pact control of Denmark. Then the East German Navy
would most likely emphasize securing SLOC's in the Baltic
and support of the Soviet Baltic Fleet in the battle for
the Norwegian Sea, as practiced during the Pact naval exer-
cises of recent years.
In wartime and in peacetime the East German Navy looks
to the Soviet Union for its leadership in the military
sphere as it does in the political, economic and technologi-
cal spheres. Soviet military doctrine and military science
permeate the East German naval infrastructure and provide
another tool for the close integration of the three Joint
Baltic Fleet Navies. This integration has been repeatedly
shown in the various exercises conducted since 1956 and in




A. CAPABILITIES OF THE WEST GERMAN NAVY
The operational areas of the West German Navy have
greatly influenced its size and design. West German naval
modernization programs continue to improve the necessary
maritime capabilities of a defensive force which is responsi-
ble for these sea areas. As discussed earlier, the West
Germans are mainly responsible for the defense of the Baltic
and the North Sea by the employment of an active "forward
defense" strategy.
The command of all West German naval combat forces ema-
nates from Gliicksburg and stresses the coordination of land,
air and naval power to achieve its missions in the Baltic
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and North Sea. In wartime the entire navy will be placed
under the direct command of the Commander Naval Approaches
Baltic in Karup , Denmark. This places the requirement of
interoperability with the other NATO maritime forces and
particularly with the Danes as a necessity. The present
capabilities and the ongoing modernization programs echo
these requirements , which continue to enhance the stature
of the West German Navy within NATO.
For a look at the disposition of the West German Naval
forces see Appendix F. A look at West Germany's current
modernization programs should convey a sense of the direc-
tion the West German Navy is embarking upon.
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The observation of Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge in 1957
—
that most of the German shipyards had been dismantled, the
others had been greatly reduced and that not one naval de-
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sign staff existed—has changed dramatically. Although
West German naval shipyards seem to be presently suffering
through the inherent poor economy of a worldwide recession,
they still maintain a shipbuilding capability of world
distinction.
The strategy of "forward defense" in the Baltic requires
the use of submarines and therefore the indigenous ship-
building industry has developed a formidable submarine con-
struction capability. The West Germans have built more
submarines since 1959 than any other country except the
Soviet Union—mostly for export but, nonetheless, an impres-
sive achievement. By the end of 1981, German shipyards had
received orders for one hundred one submarines. Of these,
fifty-two were designed and constructed to operate within the
perimeter of the sea approaches such as the Danish Straits,
the Baltic Sea and the North Sea. These types are 201, 205,
206 and 207. The Bundesmarine received eighteen submarines
of the type 206 and six of the type 205. Type 205 were con-
structed by Howaldt-Deutsche Werke (HDW) in Kiel. They are
also homeported there. Type 206 was built by HDW and
Rheinstahl-Thyssen-Nordseewerken in Emden. The Danes also





There is little doubt that the West Germans are building
sleek, conventional submarines. The United States Navy was
even considering a purchase. This submarine is built with a
single pressure hull, maneuvers exceptionally well when sub-
merged, has all equipment shock-mounted, attains a maximum
speed of twenty- two knots under water, stays submerged for a
relatively long time, has a passive-action sonar system, has
eight torpedo tubes for steerable and unsteerable torpedoes
(along with room for torpedo storage) , and needs only a
82thirty man crew. The "Type 206" submarine can also oper-
ate effectively at approximately four hundred statute miles
from its support facilities which would place its operational
range from Kiel in the Baltic to approximately a line connec-
ting North Gotland Island and Liepaja. This boat can mini-
mize the danger of a minefield by its small size,
maneuverability, and self-degaussing characteristics. It is
also capable of transporting and laying mines without reducing
8 3
the number of torpedoes or its maneuverability. It is
therefore a boat well-suited to the Baltic and capable of
implementing the "forward defense" concept. The West German
Navy expects during the middle 80 *s to modernize the Class
206 boats and to consider a possible new Type 208 boat with
an air-independent propulsion system (probably a fuel cell)
if funds can be appropriated.
The West German Navy also has an important frigate
modernization program of the "Type 122" which follows the
62

standardized NATO frigate design. The "Bremen" is the first
ship of this type. It began sea trials in May 1981. During
sea trials the "Bremen" met all specifications and require-
ments. Particularly interesting is its low noise signature
and its speed and acceleration. These frigates displace
three thousand five hundred tons. The propulsion system
consists of two LM 2500 GE gas turbines and two MTU diesel
motors in a CODOG-arrangement (combined diesel or gas)
allowing a speed of thirty knots and a range of over four
thousand nautical miles (at nineteen knots) . Armament in-
cludes eight surface-to-surface Harpoon missiles, eight
Seasparrow surface-to-air missiles, 2X24 RAM-ASMD (Rolling
airframe missile anti-ship missile defense) , tubes for MD 46
MOD 2 ASW torpedoes, and one 76/62 millimeter Oto Melara
85gun.
Additionally, these ships will carry the FL 1899S (AEG-
Telefunken) EWS and four Hycor SUBROC chaff launchers plus a
NIXIE torpedo deception system. RAM and RL-188S systems are
still under development. It is expected that "Karlsruhe"
will be the first ship to be commissioned with this complete
weapon suite. Sensor equipment includes the DA-08 air/sea
surveillance radar, the WM 25 combined search and fire con-
trol radar, and the STIR fire control system. The bow-
mounted DSQS 21 BZ sonar is a new development from Krupp-
Atlas and the navigation radar is the 32RM20 from SMA. All
ships carry two Westland Sea Lynx ASW helicopters equipped
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with the AN/AQS-18 dipping sonar (Bendix) and MK. 4 6 Mod 2
homing torpedoes.
Initially it was planned to build twelve ships of this
class to replace the six "Z" class destroyers and six Koln-
class frigates, and the first six "Type 122s" were ordered
in 1976. Since then the picture has been altered and the
Navy now has retained hopes of building two more of this
class, but procurement of the remaining four has been post-
poned until the 1990s, when a new NATO design, now under
study, might be adopted. To extend the operational capa-
bility of the West German fleet into the Norwegian Sea and
complement NATO units in the G-I-UK (Greenland- Iceland-
United Kingdom) gap, as envisioned with the extension of the
West German naval operational area in July 1980, requires
additional frigates and possibly destroyers. To fill the
gap, the four Hamburg class destroyers and three Liitjens
guided missile will be modernized again, and the Koln class
frigates will be retained, renamed as necessary, and con-
verted to act as two hundred nautical mile economic zone
87patrol vessels.
The Bremen class frigates constitute the German Navy's
largest shipbuilding program since the end of World War II
and lend credibility to the German desire to protect their
maritime interests in conjunction with their NATO partners.
An aviation acquisition which greatly enhances the capa-
bility of the "Bremen class" frigates is the Sea Lynx
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helicopter. This is the first time in the history of the
German Navy that ships will carry helicopters. Two Sea
Lynx* will be aboard each frigate for anti-submarine warfare
and to provide targeting data on vessels outside the target
acquisition range of the frigate itself. The Sea Lynx car-
ries a dipping sonar AN/AQS-18, a one hundred eighty degree
radar, and weapon stations for two torpedoes and flares.
The "bear trap" recovery system will be used in poor weather
Since six "Class 122" frigates are being built, twelve Sea
8 8Lynx are ordered.
The fleet air arm of the navy is awaiting the full out-
fitting of its air arm with the new Tornado combat aircraft.
This is a joint NATO acquisition program. The first navy
air wing in Jagel received the first of one hundred twelve
Navy-Tornadoes to be deployed there during the first part of
1982. The second navy air wing in Eggebeck will receive its
89Tornadoes in 1985. The ASW/Reconnaissance "Atlantiks" are
being updated with new electronic suites as are the fleet's
Sea King helicopters.
The fleet of "Type 143A" fast attack craft, of which
thirty are now in service, will expand to forty and be out-
fitted with four MM38 Exocet missiles each, and the 76 mm
Oto-Melara gun. They will also probably receive the RAM-
ASMD (rolling airframe missile, anti-ship missile defense)
for air defense. There is also much discussion about the
replacement of their twenty "Type 148" units, but their re-
placement is not urgent.
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The existing West German mine warfare fleet will be
modernized beginning in 1987 with ten "Type 343" units capa-
ble of minelaying and sweeping. These will replace the
Schutze-class (Type 340 and Type 341) fast minesweepers.
Around 1991, the Lindau-class minehunters (Type-331) will be
replaced by twenty "Type 332" minesweepers. The "Troika"
minesweeping system is also due to be replaced, along with
their command ships, by twelve "Type 335" (Ermiss) mine-
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sweepers. If these systems become operational for the
West German Navy, the entire present Bundesmarine mine forces
will have been modernized, with the exception of the "Type
393" and "394" inshore systems.
As the reaction time for an at-sea encounter has decreased
over the years, the need to have automatic defensive systems
has increased. For example, on November 1, 1914 the encoun-
ter between the German East Asian squadron under the command
of Vice Admiral Maximilian Graf von Spee and a British naval
group took one and a half hours between first sighting and
the beginning of battle. In World War II on May 24, 1941 in
the battle of the battleships "Hood" and the "Prince of Wales"
against the Battleship "Bismarck" and the heavy cruiser
"Prince Eugen" the time between first sighting and naval
engagement was only seventeen minutes. However, in 1967 the
Israeli destroyer "Elath" was sunk by the Soviet-built Styx




The Falklands war again emphasized the need for auto-
matic quick reaction systems. Today's new West German ships
incorporate these necessary technologically advanced systems.
The main systems in use in the West German Navy are SATIR
(System for Computation of Tactical Information for
Destroyers) and AGIS (Automatic Battle and Information
System)
. These systems are American systems which have been
further developed to better suit the conditions prevalent to
93the West German naval operational area. These electronic
systems increase the reaction capability of the fleet and
may promote the successful completion of their mission.
The West German Navy's thirty-eight thousand personnel,
both officer and enlisted, provide the interface between this
advanced technological naval equipment and its application
for the completion of the naval mission. Their training and
morale equal that of larger world navies and their decisions
will determine the outcome of any West German naval
engagement.
These major modernization programs show that the deter-
mination and the progressive spirit of the West German Navy
should not be in doubt. Most of these programs were initi-
ated by the West Germans. In the case of the construction
of the Bremen class frigates and the Tornado aircraft, the
West Germans worked together with their NATO partners, there-




B. THE CAPABILITIES OF THE EAST GERMAN NAVY
The East German Navy, like all non-Soviet navies of the
Warsaw Pact countries, is small. The Army's personnel
strength is at 108,500 regulars, whereas the Navy's strength
stands at 16,000. This numerical relationship seems to indi-
cate the usefulness of the East German Navy to the Soviets
as compared to the Army. (See Appendix F for a complete
Naval Order of Battle.)
The East German Navy assumes responsibility, according
to the Warsaw Pact, for defending the five hundred sixty
miles of East German coastline, engaging enemy naval forces,
protecting and maintaining sea communications and supporting
94land forces in coastal operations. The naval forces re-
quired to assume these tasks are divided among three task
forces and a coastal frontier brigade.
The People's Navy Command at Rostock controls 240 ships
and boats, the Coastal Frontier Brigade, a Signals Unit, the
Supply Units and a small helicopter squadron. The breakdown
of operational forces is as follows:
First Task Force—Peenemunde














Coastal Frontier Brigade— Rostock
eight groups of boats plus land forces
of twelve battalions and training units.
The main East German shipyards building naval ships are
the Stralsund shipyard, the Peenewerft in Wolgast, and the
Engelbrecht in Berlin-Kopernick. The larger ships, such as
the minelayers, are built at Stralsund and Wolgast. Amphi-
bious ships are primarily constructed at Pennewerft. Small
coastal patrol boats are built at both Wolgast and Berlin-
Kopernick. This indigenous shipbuilding capability could
certainly produce larger and more capable ships if the need
u i* .95should ever arise.
However, the East German fleet is mainly comprised of
vessels designed to operate in their coastal waters. Most,
as described earlier, are older ships transferred from the
USSR, with many of the smaller craft constructed in East
German shipyards. The major transfers to the GDR Navy are:
two Koni class (one delivered in 1978 and the other in 1979)
and one Riga class frigate, twelve Osa I and three Osa II
fast attack craft (equipped with the Soviet Styx cruise
missile) and eighteen Shershen class fast attack craft
(torpedo) . Some of the East German built ships include
twelve Frosch LST class, which are similar to the Polish
Ropuchas. This amphibious landing craft carries four 57 mm.
(twin) and four 30 mm. (twin) guns and space provided for
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rocket launcher. The Libelle class fast attack craft
(torpedo) constitutes another major design which first
appeared in 1975. It is apparently intended for defense of
naval bases, ports and their approaches. Besides carrying
two 23 mm. (twin) guns and two 21-inch stern-launched tor-
pedo tubes, it is believed capable also for minelaying and
96
commando operations.
The People's Navy modernization program has its sequel
to the West German Navy's "Bremen class" frigate in its
"Parchim class" ASW Corvettes. The Parchim class displaces
about twelve hundred tons, which makes it one-third the size
of the Bremen class but it is a welcome addition to the East
German Navy. This ship resembles the Soviet "Grisha" class
small ASW ships. Its main armament comprises four sixteen-
inch ASW torpedo tubes and two "RBU-6000" twelve tubed ASW
rocket launchers. This class carries one twin 57 mm. dual-
purpose and one twin 30 mm. anti-aircraft gun as well as two
four-railed launchers for SA-N-5 "Grail" heat-seeking mis-
siles. It is capable of minelaying and also has two depth
charge ports in the stern. These ships are being built at
the Wolgast shipyard in Peenemunde . The Parchim class will
replace the unsuccessful and obsolescent Hai-III class com-
97batants. The Navy has received five of the twelve expec-
ted and expects the program to be completed by 1984. The




Further modernization began in the East German mine-
sweeping fleet with the launching of the minesweeper
"Tangermunde" in February of 1982. This is the first of an
expected thirty "Kondor II type" minesweepers to be added to
the fleet. The Kondor II is capable of deep water mine-
sweeping operations. It displaces three hundred ten tons, is
forty-nine meters long, seven meters wide and has a draught
of two meters. This ship is powered by two diesel engines
which can provide the Kondor II with a speed of twenty-one
knots. Its weapons suite consists of six 25 mm. canons in
twin gun mounts, with one in the bow and the other two in the
stern. The Kondor I types are being transferred to the
9 8Coastal Brigade for special missions.
The naval air arm, the "Kurt Bartel" squadron, consists
of the MI-8/HIP and the MI-14/HAZE helicopters. The MI-8 is
a multi-purpose aircraft that has a gross weight of eight
thousand pounds. It also can transport twenty-four fully-
equipped combatants. At maximum gross weight the MI-8 has a
maximum range of approximately one hundred thirty km. The
MI-14/HAZE aircraft is equipped for anti-submarine warfare
and is limited to coastal ASW employment because of the lack
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of East German capability to support this aircraft at sea.
Both aircraft add considerable depth to the coastal defense




The overall capability of the East German Navy has in-
creased significantly since 1956. The present East German
Naval capability in no way equals the country's full poten-
tial. It does, however, allow for the ability to maintain
its coastal defense mission and for its close integration
with the United Baltic Fleet.
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VII. COMPARISON AND CONCLUSION
This thesis reflects an attempt to better understand the
navies of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal
Republic of Germany. A comparison of these two navies must
begin with an understanding that a direct comparison, for
example ship-for-ship or weapon-for-weapon, would be inap-
propriate. Certain asymmetries in population, size and
location, etc. lead to differing naval requirements.
There are certain disparities within the strategic geo-
graphical situation of the two German states. East Germany
and West Germany share only the same approximate location
and the same climate. The location of East Germany on the
Baltic alone dictates different maritime requirements than
West Germany, which has a coastline on both the North Sea
and the Baltic Sea.
Population and size also differ. The population of West
Germany is sixty-one million, whereas East Germany is less
than one- third that size at seventeen million. West Germany
is also larger than East Germany, with an area of approxi-
mately ninety-six thousand square miles for West Germany and
approximately forty-two thousand square miles for East
Germany. These basic differences should be mentioned in
any comparison of the navies.
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These navies share a common historical maritime tradition
which dates back to before Wilhelm II and still forms part
of each German Navy today. The new ships of the Koni class
acquired from the Soviets for the East Germans were named
the "Berlin" and "Rostock." These names also had been used
in the Kaiser's fleet. Such parallels also exist in the West
German Navy. Maritime history seems to have been a similar
uniting factor in both navies.
The internal structure of the West German Navy resembles
that of a democratic state and finds its foundation in the
West German Basic Law. The East German internal structure,
on the other hand, is an exact mirror-image of the Soviet
structure which provides for an efficient linkage with the
United Baltic Fleet. The United Baltic Fleet is mostly con-
trolled by the Soviets under the auspices of the Warsaw Pact,
while the West Germans are only totally immersed within the
NATO command during wartime. These differing structures and
alliance relationships show that the East German Navy might
at all times be an extension of the Soviet Red Banner Baltic
Fleet, whereas the West German Navy is a national navy,
which in specified crises, could come under the control of
NATO.
The doctrine and strategy of these navies basically
reflect the doctrine and strategy of their respective alli-
ances. The East Germans readily admit the complete accep-
tance of Soviet military doctrine and strategy. This is
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further reinforced by the fact that all East German military
forces are permanently assigned to the Warsaw Pact Command
and all the East German military elites have attended at
least one of the advanced military academies in the Soviet
Union. Many interrelationships between the Soviet Union and
East Germany solidify the acceptance of Soviet leadership in
doctrine and strategy.
West German naval doctrine and strategy is tied closely
to the NATO strategy of flexible response. This is a strate-
gy that West Germany helped to develop for the NATO alliance.
The West Germans have also influenced the acceptance of the
idea of "forward defense" throughout all of NATO. The West
German Navy and other West German military branches have
strongly supported this strategy and rely upon it for the
successful defense of West Germany and NATO.
The incorporation of these doctrines and strategies pro-
vides a further indication of the relationship of each
Germany to its respective alliance. The East Germans, for a
number of reasons, simply adopt Soviet doctrine and strategy,
whereas the West Germans actively engage in the development
of their alliance's strategy.
The missions of both navies strongly reflect the nature
of their geographical positions astride the Baltic
Approaches. The East Germans basically provide for coastal
defense, intelligence collection, amphibious warfare capa-
bility and some anti-submarine warfare in concert with the
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other Baltic Warsaw Pact navies within the confines of the
Western Baltic and the Baltic Approaches. The West Germans
provide seventy-five percent of the NATO naval capability in
the Baltic and their mission there must be to counter the
United Baltic Fleet by employing the concept of forward
defense. The West Germans, however, also have missions in
the North Sea and with the two NATO Naval Standing Forces in
the English Channel and the Atlantic Ocean. Both navies
have responsible missions within their alliances. However,
due to a number of political, strategic and geographical
factors, West Germany maintains a larger share of the NATO
maritime defensive responsibility than East Germany does in
the Warsaw Pact.
The capabilities of both navies are more than adequate
to meet their missions' requirements. The lack of sub-
marines and a capable naval air force by the East Germans is
well augmented by Soviet submarines and Soviet naval land-
based air support. The West Germans have built a very
capable fleet which integrates well within NATO.
The removal of the West German government's sailing re-
striction of its fleet and the deletion of the Western
European Union's restrictions (all except those concerning
nuclear weapons) have created a new freedom of movement for
the West German Navy. A navy that already provides a large
contingent for the defense of NATO can now be expected to
expand to other areas and increase the flexibility of the
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maritime defense of NATO. There can be no doubt that the
West German Navy is and will be a strong NATO asset.
The East German Navy has also shown steady growth within
the structure of the United Baltic Fleet. Until last year an
East German vessel had never conducted naval exercises upon
the high seas. Last year, however, one of its Koni class
frigates took part in an ASW exercise in the Norwegian Sea.
There are indications that the East Germans will be acquiring
more Koni class frigates from the Soviet Union, and therefore
East German participation in joint exercises in the Norwegian
Sea. or any other sea might become commonplace. Militarily,
this would enhance the capability of the East German Fleet
but politically (probably the most important reason) it would
provide evidence on the world's oceans that the concept of
"brotherhood- in-arms" works. In short, each German navy has
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Rear Services of Torpedo Patrol
the Peoj>le ' s Navy 1 Boat Brigade
Source: Based on U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Technical
Services, Joint Publications Research Service, "The GDR





















Wilhelmshaven 4 FK-Destroyers Z101A
(Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein,
Bayem, Hessen)
Kiel 4 Destroyers class 119
(Z2, Z4, Z5)




Flensburg 5 U-Jagdboote Class 420
(Theseus, Tritan, Najada,
Hermes, Thetis)
Fast Patrol Fleet Flensburg
2. Fast Patrol Squadron Olpenitz
3. Fast Patrol Squadron Flensburg
5. Fast Patrol Squadron Olpenitz
7. Fast Patrol Squadron Kiel
10 FK-Fast Patrol Boats
Class 143, 2 Tenders
(Elbe, Donau)
10 FK-Fast Patrol Boats
Class 148, 1 Tender
(Rheim)
10 FK-Fast Patrol Boats
Class 148, 1 Tender
(Main)
10 FK-Fast Patrol Boats




Mine Warfare Fleet Wilhelmshaven





3. Minesweeper Squadron Kiel 8 Inland Minesweepers
Class 393
5. Minesweeper Squadron Olpenitz 11 Fast Minesweepers
Class 340
1 Tender (Mosel)




18 Minehunters Class 331
(8 of the above are Class 320)
1 Tender Lindau
Submarine Fleet Kiel
1. Submarine Squadron Kiel 6 suba Class 205
6 suba Class 206
1 Tender (Lahn)
3. Submarine Squadron Echernforde 12 suba Class 206
1 Tender (Lech)
Naval Aviation Division Kiel
1. Naval Aviation Jagel
Sqaudron
2. Naval Aviation Eggebeck
Squadron
3. Naval Avaiation Nordholz
Squadron
60 F-104G (fighter bomber)
30 F-104G (fighter bomber)
25 RF-104G (Reconnaissance)
19 BR1150




Kiel 20 Sea Kings (Helicopters)















5 Boats (Coburg, Offenburg,
Munsterland, Wittensee,
Spiekeroog)
4 Boats (Luneburg, Wester-
wald, Harz, Walchensee)
4 Boats (Meersburg, Saarburg,
Ammersee, Langeroog)
1 Boat (Fehmarn)








Source : Die Marine Per Bundersrepublik Deutschland, Entvicklungsstand
unk Entwicklungsmoglichkeiten by Daglef Gerhardt, (Haus




EAST GERMAN AND WEST GERMAN NAVAL BATTLE ORDER
EAST GERMAN—NAVAL BATTLE ORDER
Manpower : 16,000 (includes 10,000 conscripts)
Reserves : 25,000










1 ex-Soviet Riga class
2 ex-Soviet Koni class
4 USSR built SO-1 class
15 ex-Soviet Osa class FAC's with STYX missiles
18 ex-Soviet Shershen class FAC's
30 Libelle class FAC's
154 Hits class FAC's
14 Hai class large patrol boats
18 KB 123 class coastal patrol craft
3 Robbe class
2 Labo class, a Frosch class and
1 under construction
51 Kondor I and II class coastal minesweepers
2 Kondor class I intelligence ships
Various miscellaneous craft, including
service ships (28) , icebreakers (2) , and tugs.
The Association of Sport and Technical Science
maintains some of the training ships.
1 squadron with 8 Mi-14, 5 Mi-8 helicopters
Peenemunde , Rostock, Sassnitz, Stralsund,
Warnemunde, Wolgast, Dranske-Bug Tarnewitz.
WEST GERMAN—NAVAL BATTLE ORDER
Manpower : 36,500; and about 4,800 officers; 11,000 conscripts,
Reserves : 25,000





Destroyers 3 modified Adams class DDG (with Tartar missile)
4 Hamburg class (with Exocet missile)




12 F122 frigates ordered by the West Germany Navy
are expected to be armed with Raytheon Sea Sparrow
point defense missiles, McDonnell Douglas Harpoon
anti-ship weapons and Lynx helicopters. Deliveries
are expected to begin in 1981.
Corvettes 1 Hans Burkner A 1449
5 Thetis class
Submarines 18 new construction Type 206
6 Type 205
2 Type 206






A new larger submarine (up to approximately a
displacement of 1,800 tons) is being constructed
and will be ready in the late 1980s. 6 new
submarines of Class 210, with a displacement of
750 tons, will be received over the next few
years.
10 Type 143 A (with Exocet MM 38 missile)
10 Type 142 (with Exocet MM 38 missile)
10 Zobel class (with torpedoes)
20 Type 148 (with Exocet MM 38 missile)
28 LCM type
22 LCU type
It is planned to obtain 10 Type 162 hydrofoil
FAC from the U.S.






SAMs: Roland II, Seacat
AAMs : Sidewinder
NB: A new class of minehunters, Type 342, is
planned. The Navy hopes to receive three
complete Md.86 naval gunfire systems. Also
Class 143 FAC scheduled to be procured.
87

Various miscellaneous service and regular ships,
launches , tugs , icebreakers , survey ships
,
auxilliary ships, coast guard vessels, etc.
Naval Aviation: 2 LRP squadrons (15 Breguet Atlantique)
3 fighter-bomber squadrons with 85 F-104G
(re-equipping with 22 Sea King Mk-41s for SAR
duties)
1 reconnaissance squadron with 30 RF-104s
(updating with Panavia Tornados from 1979)
SAR duties with 21 Westland Sea King Mk-41s.
MR squadrons with 19 Atlantique.
There are 20 Do-28 liaison aircraft with
Kormoran ASM.
NB: 15 Lockheed S-3A Vikings are on tentative order
from the US, and 110 Tornado FGA, 12 Lynxs and
4 Westwinds ordered.
Major naval bases Bremerhaven, Hamburg, Kiel, Wilhelshaven
Glucksburg.
Source: Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook , (Copley and Associates,
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